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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians (the “Tribe” or
the “Band”) owns much of the land under Palm Springs, Cathedral
1
City and Rancho Mirage, California. It operates resorts, casinos,

†
Gary Goldsmith received his J.D. from the University of Minnesota Law
School in 1979. He has served as Assistant Director and Management Analyst for
the Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board and was recently
appointed as the Board’s Executive Director. The author thanks Jeanne Olson
and Jeffrey Sigurdson for their valuable input and guidance in the preparation of
this article.
1. Agua Caliente History & Culture, http://www.aguacaliente.org/
default.aspx?tabid=57#overview (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
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and housing complexes.
It also participates financially in a
3
significant way in California’s electoral process.
That participation led to a confrontation over transactions
dating back to 1998 between the Tribe and the California Fair
4
Political Practices Commission (FPPC) , the agency charged with
enforcing California’s Political Reform Act (PRA), which regulates
5
financial activities related to California’s elections and lobbying.
On June 20, 2007, after nearly five years of litigation, in which
the Tribe was unable to successfully assert its claimed right of
sovereign immunity from suit, the parties entered into a stipulation
in which the Agua Caliente Band “expressly waive[d] its sovereign
immunity with respect to any enforcement of the Political Reform
Act . . . by the Fair Political Practices Commission for any future
6
violation of the Political Reform Act . . . .”
The trend of tribal financial involvement in state politics is also
well illustrated in Minnesota. In 2006, when all state legislative and
7
constitutional offices were on the ballot, political committees
registered by Minnesota Indian Tribes with the Minnesota
8
Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board spent more than
$1.2 million to influence the election of candidates for state
9
offices. More than $900,000 of that total was spent by the political
committees of just two tribes with more than $700,000 of that going

2. Id.
3. See generally Agua Caliente FPPC Compliance Information,
http://www.aguacaliente.org/GovernmentAffairsPress/FPPCCompliance
Information/tabid/104/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
4. FPPC v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No. 02AS04545, 2003
WL 733094 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. of Cal., Feb. 27, 2003). The Second
Amended Complaint alleges unreported contributions and other violations
beginning in 1998. Second Amended Complaint, available at http://www.fppc.ca.
gov/pdf/acl/AguaCalSAC2.pdf
5. Political Reform Act of 1974, 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 365, sec. 4 (West)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81000 (2005)).
6. Stipulation for J., FPPC v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No.
02AS04545 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. of Cal. 2002).
7. Minnesota’s legislative offices consist of sixty-seven state senators and 134
state representatives. MINN. STAT. § 2.031 subdiv. 1 (2006). Constitutional officers
include the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor and
State Attorney General. MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1.
8. The Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board is the
state agency charged with regulating and obtaining disclosure of financial matters
related to state elections and lobbying. MINN. STAT. § 10A.02 subdiv. 8 (2006).
9. Summary of 2006 Reports of Receipts and Expenditures (on file with the
Minnesota Campaign Finance Board) [hereinafter Reports], available at
http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/rptViewer/viewRptsOther.php.
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to the several organizational units of the Minnesota Democratic
10
Farmer Labor Party.
Minnesota tribal political spending in 2002, the previous year
in which all state offices were on the ballot, totaled less than half
11
the 2006 amount, at just over $598,000.
While all Minnesota Tribes as a group spent $1.2 million for
political purposes in 2006, the Agua Caliente Band by itself made
more than $2 million in expenditures and contributions to
12
influence California’s elections. Although significant compared
to Minnesota tribal spending, that sum was much lower than the
13
Agua Caliente Band’s spending in 2004, its highest year. That
year Proposition 70, an initiative measure related to Indian gaming
operations that would amend both the California Code and the
14
California Constitution, was on the general election ballot. The
Agua Caliente Band spent more than $16 million to influence state
elections in 2004, including more than $13 million specifically
15
related to Proposition 70.
There seems to be little question that Indian tribes are
becoming a powerful force in the states’ political processes, and
that many tribes have the funds to support their efforts. In
Minnesota, most of those funds come from tribal gaming or related
16
operations.
10. Reports, supra note 9. While candidate committees have limits on the
contributions they may accept, political party units do not. Id. The Minnesota
Democratic Farmer Labor Party is the state party affiliate of the Democratic Party.
Id.
11. Id.
12. Major Donors and Independent Expenditure Committee Campaign
Statement for the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians [hereinafter Agua
Caliente], available at http://www.aguacaliente.org/GovernmentAffairsPress/FP
PCComplianceInformation/tabid/104/Default.aspx (follow “Report for dates 0701-06–12-31-06” hyperlink).
13. Aqua Caliente, supra note 12, at Report for dates 01-01-04–12-31-04.
14. Official California Voter Information Guide, http://vote2004.sos.ca.gov/
voterguide/propositions/prop70-arguments.htm.
15. Aqua Caliente, supra note 12, at Report for dates 07-01-04–12-31-04 .
16. Tribal political committees file disclosure statements with the Minnesota
Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board under Minnesota Statutes section
10A.27 subdivision 13, which requires an entity not registered with the Board (the
Tribe) to disclose the source of funds transferred to a registered entity (the Tribal
political committee). Only two—the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe and the White
Earth Reservation—specifically list gaming revenue on their 2006 §10A.27
Disclosure Statements. The Leech Lake Band disclosed $4000 in funds from the
Leech Lake Gaming Division. Report of Receipts and Expenditures, available at
http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2006/CampFin/YE/40889.pdf.
The White Earth Reservation disclosed a contribution of $500 from its general
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Tribal gaming got its start in 1987 after the U.S. Supreme
17
Court held in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians that
states’ regulatory laws concerning gambling could not be applied to
18
tribal gaming operations on reservation land. That decision was
followed closely by adoption of the federal Indian Gaming
19
Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988. The IGRA was intended “to
provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian
tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self20
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments . . . .”
Following
enactment of the IGRA, high stakes, casino-style Indian gaming
21
began to emerge as the major source of income for many tribes.
In every election cycle, Indian tribes vigorously attempt to
influence such critical matters of state governance as to who will be
22
the state’s governor, who will be elected to the state’s legislative
fund revenue.
Report of Receipts and Expenditures, available at
http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2006/CampFin/YE/40916.pdf.
Other tribes list income from afilliated businesses. For example, the
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux community lists income from its recreational
vehicle park, disclosing $675,000 in transfers from “non-gaming revenues from the
Shakopee Dakota Meadows RV Park. Report of Receipts and Expenditures,
available at http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2006/CampFin/YE/405
50.pdf. The park is an integral part of the Tribe’s casino and golf course complex.
See Welcome to Dakotah Meadows!, http://www.ccsmdc.org/DakMead/ (last
visited Dec. 27, 2007).
The 750 member Prairie Island Indian Community transferred $175,000
in “Tribal Tax Revenues” to its political committee in 2006. Report of Receipts
and Expenditures, available at http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2006
/CampFin/YE/30555.pdf. The Prairie Island Community operates Treasure
Island Resort & Casino which includes a casino, luxury hotel, four restaurants, and
other attractions. See Prairie Island Indian Community, http://www.prairieisland.
org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2007); see also http://www.treasureislandcasino.com (last
visited Dec. 27, 2007).
17. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
18. See id. at 221–22 (holding that where states regulated rather than
prohibited gaming activities, the state regulations could not be applied on
reservations).
19. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–03, 2706–14, 2716–17(a), 2719–21 (2006).
20. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2006).
21. See ALAN MEISTER, CASINO CITY’S INDIAN GAMING INDUSTRY REPORT, 2007–
2008 (6th ed. 2007). The report estimates that revenue (amounts wagered less
prizes and payouts) at Indian gaming establishments rose from approximately
$121 million in 1988 to more than $25 billion in 2006.
22. In Minnesota in 2006, five tribes donated a total of $8500 to the
Democratic candidate for governor (the maximum donation allowed was $2,000
per donor). See Reports, supra, note 9. (Reports of Receipts and Expenditures for
the year ending December 31, 2006.) (Select first letter of donor name then click
on link to the specific donor.) The following tribal political committees
contributed to Mike Hatch, the Democratic candidate for governor, in 2006: Bois
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23

24

bodies, and what will be the provisions of the state’s constitution.
These incursions into the realm of state governance have renewed
questions about the sovereignty of Indian tribes in relation to the
states’ sovereignty.
In order to understand those conflicting rights, this article will
review the historical roots of legal doctrine regarding the position
of Indian tribes with respect to the United States government and
25
each state’s government. It will then trace significant doctrinal
changes that arose as the result of changing political and cultural
26
attitudes toward Indians.
Finally, it will address new theories
27
raised in Agua Caliente v. California FPPC and will comment on the
California Supreme Court’s resolution of the constitutional issues
28
and the parties’ eventual Stipulation for Judgment in that matter.
II. JOHN MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT ESTABLISH THE
ROOTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
The first United States Supreme Court case to address the
29
status of Indian tribes was Johnson v. M’Intosh. When M’Intosh was
before the Court, John Marshall was in his twenty-second year as
30
Chief Justice of the Court.
He had successfully laid several
31
important foundations for a strong federal government and had

Forts Political Education Fund ($1000), Fond du Lac Committee of Political
Education ($2000), Leech Lake PAC ($500), Mah Mah Wi No Min Fund I—the
political fund of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians, ($2000), Prairie Island
Indian Community PAC ($2000), Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux ($2000).
23. See generally Reports, supra note 9 (Reports of Receipts and Expenditures
filed by Minnesota tribal political committees for the year ending December 31,
2006, showing numerous contributions to Minnesota candidates).
24. See discussion of California’s Proposition 70 supra note 12; supra note 9.
25. See infra Parts II–IV.
26. See infra Parts V–VI.
27. 148 P.3d 1126 (2007).
28. See infra Parts VII–VIII.
29. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
30. John Marshall was appointed to the Supreme Court by John Adams in
1801, and served until 1835. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL—DEFINER OF A
NATION 282, 523 (1996).
31. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Court
established the doctrine of inherent powers granted in the Constitution to the
federal government and the supremacy of federal institutions over state laws that
might hinder their purpose. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824),
Marshall laid out his expansive view of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution
and Congress’ power to regulate the broad range of activities that would thereafter
be considered part of commerce between the states.
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32

established the Judiciary as a powerful branch of that government.
33
Given Marshall’s federalist credentials, it is not surprising that in
this first of the Indian cases, the decision between rights of the
Indians and rights of the United States government in certain land
resulted in a doctrine that strengthened the federal government at
the expense of the Indians.
M’Intosh involved an action for ejectment in which the
defendant claimed the disputed land through a patent from the
United States and the plaintiffs claimed the same land through
34
conveyances from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians. Judgment
in the court below found that only the United States had the right
35
to transfer title to the land.
The question, according to Marshall, was confined to “the
power of the Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a
36
title which can be sustained by the courts of this country,” but to
answer that question, Marshall would have to examine the
relationship between the United States and the Indians. Marshall
concluded that the Indians did not have the power to give title to
37
the land they occupied.
To reach this conclusion, Marshall began with a fundamental
38
premise that “cannot be drawn into question.” His premise was
that it is the right of a society to prescribe rules by which title to
lands may be acquired. Thus, those rules must depend entirely on
39
the law of the nation in which the lands lie.
A key principle of the law of “civilized” nations was that
“discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by
40
whose authority, it was made. . . .” From this principle of the
discoverer’s right, two corollaries arose. First, the discoverer had
the sole right of acquiring the soil from any Indians who may be in
32. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 37 (1803), Marshall wrote the opinion
establishing the doctrine of judicial review, giving the Court the authority to
review the constitutionality of legislative acts. Marbury was followed by cases
establishing the federal courts’ authority to review civil cases, i.e., Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), and criminal cases, Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
264 (1821).
33. SMITH, supra note 30, at 8.
34. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 572.
37. Id. at 603–605.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 573.
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possession; and second, relations between the discoverer and
41
Indians were to be regulated by those parties.
Marshall recognized that in establishing the relationship
between Indians and the discoverer, the rights of the Indians “were
42
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.” The Indians were
recognized as having a right of possession or occupancy of the soil,
but “their power to dispose of the soil at their own will . . . was
denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave
43
exclusive title to those who made it.” As a result, the Indians’
“rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
44
necessarily diminished . . . .”
The Indians’ right to possession might be extinguished “by
45
purchase or by conquest” and “[c]onquest gives a title which the
46
Courts of the conqueror cannot deny . . . .” The claims of Britain
had been established and maintained as far west as the Mississippi
“by the sword” and it was not for the courts, Marshall said, to
47
question the validity of this title.
Having decided that the absolute title to the land, resides in
the conqueror and that absolute title to land cannot reside in two
48
entities at the same time, Marshall concluded that only the United
49
States could transfer valid title to the subject land. The Indian
inhabitants, he said, “are to be considered merely as occupants, to
be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their
lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title
50
to others.”
M’Intosh established two principles that would shape United
States Indian law. First, while Indians may have considered
themselves to be sovereigns or nations, that sovereignty was
diminished by discovery and conquest. Second, the Indians were
merely occupants of the land with no actual ownership rights.
Even their occupancy of the land was subject to the authority of the
United States.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 588–89.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 587–88.
Id. at 591.
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Marshall next addressed the status of Indian tribes in 1831.
51
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia arose as the result of a motion by the
Cherokee Nation of Indians for an injunction to restrain the State
of Georgia from enforcing its laws on lands within the Cherokee
territory.
Georgia was essentially attempting to abolish the
Cherokee Nation. It nullified Cherokee laws, extended Georgia
law to the Cherokee territory, and provided for the survey of all
Cherokee lands in Georgia and for their distribution by lottery to
52
the people of Georgia.
Georgia was losing patience with the federal government,
which had agreed as a condition of Georgia’s cession of territorial
land to the United States in 1802 to extinguish Indian claims to the
53
land that remained as part of the State of Georgia. The Indian
54
Removal Act of 1830 had just passed giving President Andrew
Jackson the authority to negotiate treaties wherein Indian tribes
would exchange land east of the Mississippi for land in the west and
would relocate to that land. The Cherokees were unwilling to trade
55
their land and relocate. Georgia decided to take matters into its
own hands.
Marshall candidly stated what had happened to the Cherokee
nation since discovery:
A people once numerous, powerful, and truly
independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and
uncontrolled possession of an ample domain, gradually
sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our
arms, have yielded their lands by successive treaties, each
of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until
they retain no more of their formerly extensive territory
than is deemed necessary to their comfortable
56
subsistence.
51. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
52. See id. at 7, 13.
53. See id. at 8. The Cherokee Indians ceded land in Georgia making their
reservation smaller and smaller until it was so small that they “resolved to cede no
more.” Id. Georgia applied to the United States to remove the Indians by force in
order to meet its obligations under the cession agreement of 1802. Id. Presidents
Monroe and Adams agreed to remove the Indians, but only by peaceful means. Id.
The state of Georgia then resorted to its own means to force the Cherokee Indians
from lands within the state. Id.
54. 21st Cong., Sess. I, ch. 148, 411–12 (1830), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=004/llsl004.db&rec
Num=458.
55. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 10.
56. Id. at 15.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/7

8

Goldsmith: Big Spenders in State Elections—Has Financial Participation by In
GOLDSMITH - ADC

2008]

2/3/2008 2:55:06 PM

TRIBAL PARTICIPATION IN STATE ELECTIONS

667

After expressing sympathy for the claim, Marshall began a
detailed examination of the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.
Article Three of the Constitution provides that the federal courts
shall have jurisdiction over cases “between a state or the citizens
57
thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.” The question of
jurisdiction hinged on whether the Cherokee nation was a “foreign
58
state.”
Justice Marshall recognized that the Cherokee tribe had many
of the attributes of a state in the sense that it was “a distinct political
59
society . . . capable of managing its own affairs . . . .” But, he also
recognized the unique situation that this state-within-a-state
60
relationship created. Indian territory, for example, was part of the
61
United States and in the areas of commerce and foreign relations,
the tribes were considered as within the jurisdiction of the United
62
States.
It is in this context that Marshall questioned whether
63
Indian tribes may accurately be described as foreign nations. He
reasoned that “[t]hey may, more correctly, perhaps, be
64
denominated domestic dependent nations.”
In his concurring opinion, Justice Johnson said the tribes
“never have been recognized as holding sovereignty over the
65
territory they occupy.” But he also recognized that “their right of
66
personal self government has never been taken from them . . . .”
Not surprisingly, Marshall concluded that Indian tribes are not
67
foreign states within the meaning of the Constitution. Therefore,
68
the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter.
Cherokee Nation is important not so much for the jurisdictional
holding but for the analysis of the Indians’ status and its conclusion
that Indian tribes were not completely sovereign but were
69
“domestic dependent nations.”

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 17.
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Justice Marshall had another opportunity to examine the
status of the Cherokee’s relationship with the state of Georgia and
70
with the United States the following year. In Worchester v. Georgia,
one of the same Georgia statutes that gave rise to Cherokee Nation
was again the subject of review. This time jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court was proper as the case was between a citizen of
71
Vermont and the state of Georgia.
Under Georgia’s new laws, Worcester had been convicted of
residing in Cherokee territory without permission from the state
and without swearing an oath to support and defend the
72
constitution and laws of Georgia. He was sentenced to four years
73
of hard labor in the state penitentiary. Worcester’s contention
was that Georgia’s act was unconstitutional and void because it was
repugnant to treaties between the United States and the Cherokee
and because it interfered with intercourse between the Cherokee
nation and the United States, an area of the law reserved to
74
Congress.
Justice Marshall reviewed the relationship between the
Cherokees and the United States government from discovery
75
through the 1791 Treaty of Holston, which he found had been
76
frequently renewed and was still in full force. This treaty, Marshall
concluded, “explicitly recogniz[ed] the national character of the
Cherokees, and their right of self government; thus guarantying
their lands; assuming the duty of protection, and of course
77
pledging the faith of the United States for that protection . . . .”
Marshall concluded that:
The Indian nations had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors
of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which
secluded them from intercourse with any other European

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 540.
Id.
Id. at 554–56.
Id. at 556.
Id.
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potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the
78
particular region claimed . . . .
Further evidence of the Indians’ status was found in the fact
that the United States generally applied the term “nation” to
79
Indian tribes and regularly entered into treaties with the tribes.
The Constitution, declaring such treaties to be the supreme law of
the land, acknowledged the status of Indian tribes as “among those
80
powers who are capable of making treaties.”
The fact that the Cherokees, by treaty, placed themselves in
the protection of the United States did not limit their right to selfgovernment. Rather, the very fact of the repeated signing of
treaties with the Cherokees recognized that right. According to
Justice Marshall, it was the settled law of nations that a weaker
nation accepting the protection of a stronger one does not,
81
therein, surrender its right to self-government.
The Court’s conclusion became inescapable: the whole
intercourse between the United States and the Cherokee nation,
being vested by the Constitution and laws in the government of the
United States, mandates that the laws of Georgia can have no effect
82
within the boundaries of the Cherokee territory.
Thus, by 1835, it was clear that Indian tribes were considerably
less than sovereign nations. They had no absolute title to their
land and were under the “protection” of the United States. But
they still had the right to deal with the United States by way of
treaties and their sovereignty against the authority of the individual
states appeared to be established.
III. THE PROMISES OF INDIAN TREATIES ARE WEAKENED AS A BASIS
FOR TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY.
The limits of tribal sovereignty were tested soon and regularly.
One of the first areas to be limited was Indian treaty rights. In
83
1845, in United States v. Rogers, the defendant, a white man, was
84
accused of murdering another white man in Cherokee territory.
The defendant claimed that the Cherokee had adopted both him
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 559.
Id. at 559–60.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id.
45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
Id. 567–68.
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85

and the deceased into their tribe.
The U.S. law in question
extended federal criminal jurisdiction over all lands within the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except for
86
jurisdiction over crimes by one Indian against another. A treaty
with the Cherokee Indians gave them the right to govern their
territory so long as their laws were not inconsistent with those of
87
the United States.
The Court began by holding that Cherokee territory was land
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and
that the Cherokee Indians occupied it only with the consent of the
88
United States. That Rogers was a member of the Cherokee tribe
89
was no objection to the jurisdiction of the district court.
As
support for this position, the Court said:
[W]e think it too firmly and clearly established to admit of
dispute that the Indian tribes residing within the
territorial limits of the United States are subject to their
authority, and where the country occupied by them is not
within the limits of one of the States, Congress may by law
punish any offense committed there, no matter whether
90
the offender be a white man or an Indian.
But the federal statute excluded crimes by one Indian against
another. After making the statement quoted above, that the
nationality of the offender would not matter, the Court
nevertheless held that the adoption of the defendant into the tribe
did not make him an Indian within the meaning of the federal
91
statute. Holding that the defendant was not an Indian appears to
render the statement quoted above as dicta. That same statement
would be cited and quoted as holding twenty-five years later in The
92
Cherokee Tobacco.
By 1870, federal statutes were coming into direct conflict with
Indian treaties in ways that could not be reconciled. In The Cherokee
Tobacco, the Court considered the conflict between a federal statute
imposing a tax on tobacco in all territories within the boundaries of
85. Id. at 568
86. Id. at 570–71.
87. Id. at 573.
88. See id. at 572.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 573. The Rogers Court also considered whether the treaty with
the Cherokee tribe precluded application of the federal statute and found the
statute and the treaty not to be in conflict. Id.
92. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 619 (1870).
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the United States and an Indian treaty provision that allowed
Indians to grow and sell tobacco, paying tax only on that portion
93
sold outside Indian territory.
The defendant owners of the
subject tobacco, the impoundment of which was sought by the
United States, were Cherokee Indians who had grown the tobacco
within the boundaries of the Cherokee nation.
The Court cited Cherokee Nation for the proposition that Indian
94
Territory is part of the United States. It then repeated the entire
quote from Rogers for the proposition that Indians residing in the
territorial United States are under the jurisdiction of the United
States, saying that both principles were “so well settled in our
jurisprudence that it would be a waste of time to discuss them or to
95
refer to further authorities in their support.”
96
Relying on cases involving treaties with foreign nations, The
Cherokee Tobacco Court held that an act of Congress could supersede
97
a prior treaty. When the two cannot be reconciled, legislative
action is to be given effect in the courts and any resolution of the
98
conflict must be addressed in the legislative branch. Thus, by
1870, the power of Congress to abrogate the provisions of Indian
treaties was established.
The next year the power of Indians to enter into new treaties
with the United States was abolished by statute. The act of March
3, 1871, provided that:
No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an
independent nation, tribe, or power, with whom the
United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of
any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian
nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby
99
invalidated or impaired.
100
Fifteen years later, in United States v. Kagama, Justice Miller
lamented that, “after an experience of a hundred years of the
treaty-making system of government, Congress has determined
93. Id. at 617.
94. See id. at 619.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 621. The court cited Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 784 (2 Curtis
454) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13799); The Clinton Bridge, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454
(1870).
97. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 617.
98. Id. at 621.
99. 16 Stat. 566; Rev. Stat. §2079 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §71 (2006)).
100. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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upon a new departure, -to govern [the Indians] by acts of
101
Congress.”
Kagama examined a congressional act that extended U.S.
criminal law to crimes by one Indian against another, regardless of
102
On the
whether the crime was committed on Indian land.
question of the act’s constitutionality, the Court found little in the
language of the Constitution to help. It determined that the power
of Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes did not
103
provide a basis for the legislation. Relying on Cherokee Nation for
the premise that Indian tribes are not states or nations, the Court
upheld the act, holding that there are only two sovereignties in the
United States; that of the federal government and that of the
104
states.
In what now may seem a sad commentary, Justice Miller raised
the government “protection” relationship with the Indians as part
of the basis for stripping them of another aspect of their
sovereignty. He said:
The power of the general government over these
remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and
diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as
well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It
must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else; because the theater of its exercise
is within the geographical limits of the United States;
because it has never been denied; and because it alone
105
can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
After Kagama, it was clearly established that Indian tribes had
no treaties and no inherent sovereignty that would protect them
against congressional action. They were now truly dependent on
the will of Congress to protect the remaining remnants of their
existence as governments. The authority of the states over Indian
tribes, however, was a different matter. The holding of Worcester
remained strong, although states were beginning to succeed in
asserting their jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 382.
See id. at 376–77.
See id. at 378–79.
See id. at 379.
Id. at 384–85.
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IV. STATES’ EFFORTS TO EXERT THEIR JURISDICTION OVER TRIBAL
LANDS AND MEMBERS
The first successful state encroachments on tribal sovereignty
involved assertion of state court jurisdiction over non-Indians in
events that occurred on Indian reservations.
106
In 1881, the Court considered United States v. McBratney, a
case in which a white man, McBratney, was convicted in federal
circuit court of the murder of another white man. The murder
107
occurred on the Ute Indian Reservation in Colorado.
Federal jurisdiction was supported by a statute giving the
courts of the United States jurisdiction over the crime of murder
occurring in parts of the country under the “exclusive jurisdiction
108
Additional
of the United States,” including Indian country.
support for federal jurisdiction was found in the treaty of March 2,
1868, between the United States and the Ute Indians, which
provided for trial and punishment under U.S. law of wrongs by
109
whites against Indians or others on the Ute Indians’ territory.
Subsequent to enactment of the federal criminal statute and
signing of the treaty, the act of Congress of March 3, 1875, chapter
139, provided for the admission of Colorado to the Union. The act
authorized the inhabitants of the territory to form a state
government; it did not contain any exception for the Ute
110
reservation, or jurisdiction over it, from the new state.
McBratney challenged the jurisdiction of the U.S. court over
the matter, claiming that jurisdiction lay in the state courts of
111
112
Colorado. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the Court.
Relying on Cherokee Tobacco, the Court held that the act
forming the state of Colorado necessarily repealed any prior
federal statute or treaty provision that was inconsistent with the
113
Further, the Court held that the act, which established
act.
Colorado “upon an equal footing with the original States in all
114
respects whatever,” gave the state criminal jurisdiction over all of

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

104 U.S. 621 (1881).
Id. at 621–22.
Id.
See id. at 622.
See id. at 623.
Id. at 621–22.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id. at 624.
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its own citizens throughout its territorial limits, including the Ute
115
The earlier federal statute and treaty provisions
Reservation.
giving exclusive jurisdiction over certain crimes to the United
States government were repealed by implication because they were
116
inconsistent with the statehood act.
McBratney established the principle that state jurisdiction is not
117
It was no longer an
always limited by the reservation boundary.
absolute rule that the United States or the Indian tribes had sole
118
and exclusive jurisdiction over activities on reservations.
The McBratney finding—that the new state of Colorado had
jurisdiction over non-Indian crimes against other non-Indians—was
119
extended to the original states in New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin.
The Ray Court said that McBratney and cases that followed it “all
held that in the absence of a limiting treaty obligation or
congressional enactment, each state had a right to exercise
120
jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its boundaries.”
The reach of state criminal jurisdiction on reservations was
121
clarified in Donnelly v. United States, wherein the defendant, a
white man who had murdered an Indian, challenged federal
122
There, it was held that the McBratney doctrine was
jurisdiction.
limited to crimes of non-Indians against non-Indians and federal
jurisdiction could be maintained where one of the parties involved
123
in the incident was an Indian.
The limit of state court jurisdiction was further clarified in
124
Williams v. Lee in which Williams, a non-Indian, operated a store
on the Navajo reservation. He sued in Arizona state court to collect
money owed to him by two Navajo Indians for credit extended at
125
his store.
The Court held that suit in state court to collect a debt
incurred by Indians on their reservation was prohibited because
imposition of state jurisdiction in such a situation would infringe

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 621–24.
118. Id. at 624.
119. 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
120. Id. at 499.
121. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
122. Id. at 252.
123. See id. at 271–72.
124. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
125. Id. at 217–18.
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126

on the tribe’s sovereignty. Justice Black, delivering the opinion of
the Court, said that although the Court had modified the
principles of Worcester over the years “in cases where essential tribal
relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would
127
not be jeopardized,” its basic policy was still law. The Court went
on to say that “[e]ssentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
128
them.” Justice Black’s announcement of what appeared to be an
infringement test for determining the scope of state jurisdiction
over Indian tribes was a significant departure from the absolute
129
doctrine expressed in Worcester and from prior decisions.
Applying the newly announced test to the facts before it in
Williams, the Court held that there could be no doubt that “to allow
the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the
authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence
130
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”
If the power of self-government was to be taken away from the
131
Indians, the Court said, it was for Congress to take that action.
The result reached in Williams is far less important than the
principle the Court established: that state jurisdiction over tribes
may be allowed if it does not infringe on the tribe’s right to self132
After Williams, the strength of tribal sovereignty
government.
principles to protect tribes from incursions of state law was
weakened, but still appeared strong, at least where the state action
133
would unduly infringe on the tribe’s right of self-government.
But the clarity of the doctrine expressed in Worcester in 1835 was an
134
idea of the past.

126. Id. at 223.
127. Id. at 219.
128. Id. at 220.
129. Id. at 223; see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
130. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
131. The Court also noted that although Congress granted to the states the
right to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Reservations and their resident
Indians, Arizona had not taken the steps to assume such jurisdiction. Id. at 224
n.10. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 substituted provisions giving the
consent of the United States to states’ assumption of jurisdiction over tribal civil
and criminal matters, but required approval of the tribe by vote of a majority of its
members. 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (a) (1968).
132. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 217.
133. See id.
134. See id.
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Another important case to address tribal sovereignty was
135
McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, in which the State
of Arizona attempted to impose its personal income tax on a
Navajo Indian who lived on the reservation and derived all of her
136
The Arizona state courts that
income from reservation sources.
137
considered the matter held that the application was permissible.
On review by the United States Supreme Court, Justice Thurgood
138
Justice Marshall
Marshall wrote on behalf of the Court.
recognized that the Indian sovereignty doctrine had not remained
139
static in the 141 years since the decision in Worcester.
Rather, it
had undergone “considerable evolution in response to changed
140
circumstances.”
In McClanahan, Marshall observed that “the
trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty
as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre141
emption.” According to Marshall, “[t]he modern cases thus tend
to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to
look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the
142
limits of state power.”
The Indian sovereignty doctrine no longer provided the basis
for “definitive resolution” of state jurisdiction matters, but provided
a “backdrop” against which treaties and federal statutes should be
143
read.
Against that backdrop, the Court found that treaties with
the Navajo Indians and federal statutes prohibited Arizona’s
attempt to impose its income tax on Indians living and working on
144
the reservation.
McClanahan is significant in part for its general acceptance,
with clarification, of the Williams infringement test. Williams
provided that “absent any governing Acts of Congress” the test to
be applied is whether a state action infringes on the right of Indian
145
self-government.

135. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
136. Id. at 165.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 171.
140. Id. at 171.
141. Id. at 172.
142. Id. (footnote omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 181.
145. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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The McClanahan Court considered the relevance of the
Williams test to the case sub judice and noted that the “cases
applying the Williams test dealt principally with situations involving
146
non-Indians.” In such cases, “both the tribe and the State could
fairly claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions.
The Williams infringement test was designed to resolve this conflict
by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point
147
where tribal self-government would be affected.” In McClanahan,
the income that Arizona wanted to tax was earned by an Indian
148
solely through reservation sources. Thus, the matter was entirely
within the scope of jurisdiction retained by the tribe by treaty and
149
federal statute.
In such a case, the treaties and federal statutes
preempt state law and the Williams infringement test is not
150
applicable.
V. THE REGULATORY CASES PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATES
TO INCREASE THEIR POWER OVER INDIAN TRIBES
Based on Williams as clarified by McClanahan, the law as of
1973 seemed to be that if federal statutes and treaties governed a
matter, then state jurisdiction on reservation land would not
151
apply.
If the matter was not preempted by federal law and
treaties, then whether the state could assert jurisdiction depended
on whether the state’s action infringed to an unacceptable degree
on the tribal right of self-government. So, because of the state
interest in governing its own territory, state jurisdiction over
activities that occurred off of reservations would be easier to
establish.
152
In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, the Indian tribe did not
have a reservation or a treaty with the United States. The dispute
was whether state law that prohibited salmon traps could be
153
The tribe had been
enforced against the tribe on state land.
154
granted permits for the traps by the United States government.
The Court held that state law was applicable to prohibit use of the
146. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 165.
149. Id. at 179–80.
150. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 217.
151. See id.; see also McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164.
152. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
153. Id. at 62.
154. Id. at 61.
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155

traps. citing Williams and New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin the Court
said that:
These decisions indicate that even on reservations state
laws may be applied to Indians unless such application
would interfere with reservation self-government or
impair a right granted or reserved by federal law . . . .
State authority over Indians is yet more extensive over
156
activities, such as in this case, not on any reservation.
Although Organized Village of Kake predated McClanahan, it
continued to be cited for the proposition that state authority over
off-reservation activities was more easily established than it would
157
be for conduct within Indian territory.
158
Thus, in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, the Court held that
the state could impose its gross receipts tax on a ski resort operated
159
by a tribe on land outside the reservation. The Court recognized
the line of cases prohibiting state taxation of on-reservation
activities, but relied on Organized Village of Kake for its ruling, saying
that “Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally
been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise
160
applicable to all citizens of the state.”
In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
161
Reservation, the Court considered the state of Montana’s attempt
to apply its cigarette tax to all sales of cigarettes by Indian
162
smokeshops operated on reservation lands.
Relying on
McClanahan, the Court prohibited the application of the cigarette
163
tax to on-reservation sales to Indians.
But the Court was
unwilling to extend McClanahan to prohibit imposition of state tax

155. Id. at 68.
156. Id. at 75.
157. See Texas v. U.S., 497 F.3d 491, 510 (5th Cir. 2007); People of South
Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870, 876–77 (D. Alaska 1979); John v.
Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 773 (Alaska 1999); State ex rel. Peterson v. Dist. Court of
Ninth Judicial Dist., 617 P.2d 1056, 1063 (Wyo. 1980).
158. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
159. Id. at 157–58.
160. Id. at 148–49 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 391 U.S.
392 (1968) (upholding the state’s right to regulate the time and manner of
Indian’s off-reservation fishing rights); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896)
(upholding state jurisdiction over off-reservation hunting; and other cases)).
161. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
162. Id. at 467–68.
163. Id. at 480–81.
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164

on cigarette sales to non-Indians. The tax in question was a direct
tax imposed by statute on the purchaser and collected by the seller
165
merely as a convenience.
As such, it was not a tax on the tribe,
166
which would have been prohibited by McClanahan.
The tribes argued that making them an involuntary tax
collector was a gross interference with their right to be free of state
167
regulation.
The Court disagreed, holding that “[t]he State’s
requirement that the Indian tribal seller collect a tax validly
imposed on non-Indians [was] a minimal burden designed to avoid
the likelihood that in its absence non-Indians purchasing from the
168
tribal seller will avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax.” While
the activities that would be required in the tax collection system
were not described, the Court held that because the collection
burden was not a tax on the Indians, the cases prohibiting taxation
169
of tribes themselves were inapplicable.
The Court saw “nothing
in this burden which frustrates tribal self-government or runs afoul
of any congressional enactment dealing with the affairs of
170
reservation Indians.” Because the state tax was not preempted by
federal law and the burden on the tribes was acceptable,
application of the Williams infringement test did not require
171
striking down the state statutes.
The state of Washington took the matter of state tax collection
further. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
172
Reservation, the state imposed both a cigarette tax and a state sales
tax which applied to cigarettes and other items sold by Indian
173
The
businesses on the reservation to non-Indian purchasers.
Court recognized that the large majority of cigarette sales from
these shops were to non-Indians traveling to the reservation to take
174
advantage of the tribes’ claimed exemption from the state tax.
The Indians’ businesses were therefore largely dependent on their

164. Id.
165. Id. at 482.
166. Id. at 480–81.
167. Id. at 482.
168. Id. at 483.
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938).
171. Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
172. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
173. Id. 141–42.
174. Id. at 145.
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tax-exempt status which, if lost, would cause sales of cigarettes to
175
fall sharply.
Based on Moe, the Court held that the state could impose its
nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian customers of the Indian
176
This was true even if imposition of the tax drastically
retailers.
reduced the Indian seller’s business with non-Indians by
eliminating the price advantage that arose from the claimed tax
177
exemption. The Court also relied on Moe for authority to impose
at least “minimal” burdens on Indian retailers to collect the state
178
tax.
The Court said that the cigarette tax collection burden
179
under review was indistinguishable from that approved in Moe.
The burdens of Washington’s sales tax scheme, however, were
more extensive than those approved in Moe. The sales tax statutes
required Indian retailers to keep detailed records of both exempt
180
and nonexempt sales in addition to precollecting the sales tax.
For taxable sales to non-tribal members, the seller was required to
181
record the number and dollar volume. For exempt sales to tribe
members, the seller was required to record and retain for state
inspection the names of all tribal purchasers, their tribal
affiliations, the reservation on which the sale was made, and the
182
amount and date of the sale.
For members not known to the
seller, presentation of a tribal identification card by the purchaser
183
was required.
The Court found the recordkeeping requirements completely
184
valid. In a new twist on the Williams infringement test, the Court
said the tribes had the burden of showing that the recordkeeping
185
requirements were invalid.
Since there was no evidence
presented in the district court about whether the requirements
were reasonably necessary, the tribes failed to meet their burden of
proving that the state’s recordkeeping requirements were not
186
“reasonably necessary” to prevent fraudulent transactions.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
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Colville established the level of state need for regulation as one
of reasonable necessity to meet the state purpose and further
established a presumption in favor of state jurisdiction to regulate,
187
which must be disproved by the tribe.
In addressing the preemption part of the Williams
infringement test, the Colville Court said that “[t]he federal statutes
cited to us, even when given the broadest reading to which they are
fairly susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt Washington’s sales
188
and cigarette taxes.”
The Court also found no support for
189
Having
preemption of the state tax laws in the tribe’s treaties.
addressed the preemption question, the Court held that the state
did not infringe on tribal rights to self-government merely because
its laws deprived the tribe from its cigarette sales income by
190
The Court also held that “the
removing the tax exemption.
State’s interest in taxing these purchasers outweighs any tribal
interest that may exist in preventing the State from imposing its
191
taxes.” Finding no federal preemption and an acceptable level of
burden on the tribe, the Court held that the state statutes were
192
valid.
The Court reviewed the principles of Williams, McClanahan,
and Colville again in 1994 in Department of Taxation & Finance of New
193
York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., in which New York attempted
to enforce its cigarette tax laws on non-Indian purchasers at tribal
shops by means of restrictions, recordkeeping requirements, and
precollection of the taxes imposed on wholesalers who provided
194
the cigarettes to the tribes.
The cigarette tax system in New York required licensed Indiantrader wholesalers to purchase tax stamps and affix them to
195
The tax became a part of
cigarette packages before retail sale.
the retail price of the cigarettes and was considered a tax on the
196
ultimate purchaser, not the wholesaler or the retailer. The state
believed that far more untaxed cigarettes were being sold on

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 156.
Id.
Id. at 161.
Id.
512 U.S. 61 (1994).
Id. at 64–67 (outlining New York’s cigarette taxation regulations).
Id. at 64.
Id.
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reservations than would be the case if only tribe members were
purchasing them; so, it instituted a system of quotas based on
calculated demand for cigarettes by Indians purchasing on the
197
reservation.
The system also imposed recordkeeping
198
requirements related to sales of untaxed cigarettes.
The Milhelm Attea Court first confronted the question of
“whether the New York scheme is inconsistent with the Indian
199
The question was whether the extensive
Trader Statutes.”
collection of federal laws regulating wholesalers trading with
200
Indians preempted application of the state’s regulatory scheme.
The Court reviewed the system of federal laws and rules governing
Indian traders and noted its “sweeping” and “comprehensive”
201
scope.
Nevertheless, the Court found that because the cigarette
tax in question was not imposed directly on the traders, it was not
202
governed by the federal system. The Court held “Indian traders
are not wholly immune from state regulation that is reasonably
203
necessary to the assessment or collection of lawful state taxes.”
Having found no federal preemption, the Court still had to
address other principles that might preclude the state from
204
exercising its jurisdiction. The next hurdle, the Court said, was to
decide whether the lower court was correct in striking the state law
205
because it “imposes excessive burdens on Indian traders.”
It is
interesting that in this case, the balancing test between the state
interest and the burden is applied to the burden on Indian traders,
not the burden on the tribes themselves. Nevertheless, the Court
said it would apply the reasoning of its Indian cases and cited
Colville in saying that the system was “a ‘reasonably necessary’
206
method of ‘preventing fraudulent transactions.’”
After Milhelm, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the
status of the states’ right to regulate Indians and Indian tribes.
First, it is still true that states have very little authority to regulate
197. Id. at 65.
198. Id. at 67.
199. Id. at 70.
200. Id. at 64.
201. Id. at 70 (citing Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S.
685, 687-89 (1965)).
202. Id. at 74–75.
203. Id. at 75.
204. See id.
205. Id. (emphasis in original).
206. Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160, 162 (1980)).
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strictly on-reservation transactions involving tribe members. State
authority to regulate off-reservation activities or on-reservation
conduct with non-tribe members is much broader. Apparently, a
federal preemption test will be applied, and if federal law preempts
207
But, the federal
the state regulation, the latter will fail.
preemption may have to be quite specific to the conduct the state is
attempting to regulate. The mere establishment of a reservation or
recognition of a tribe by the federal government will not likely be a
sufficient basis for a finding of federal preemption.
Once it is determined that federal preemption is not
208
applicable, a balancing test will be applied. The test has evolved
to a point where it appears to tilt in favor of the state. If the state is
attempting to apply a law of general application, the state must
show that the regulation is reasonably necessary to advance a
209
legitimate state interest. The regulation may burden the subject
Indian tribe so long as it does not interfere with the actual
functions of tribal government. If it does interfere with tribal selfgovernment, the tribe would be required to show that the
regulation is excessively burdensome or not reasonably necessary
before the state would be precluded from applying it.
States’ ability to apply their laws in Indian territory and against
Indians has changed greatly since Worcester v. Georgia. Although the
states’ jurisdiction to regulate Indian tribes has greatly expanded,
the states still face limits on their ability to enforce their regulations
by legal suit against tribes.
VI. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT: FROM A WEAK START
TO A SKEPTICAL AFFIRMATION
By 1998, the doctrine of sovereign immunity of Indian tribes
had undergone more than 150 years of change and modification,
mostly to the detriment of the Indian tribes. Tribes could no
longer enter into treaties and their sovereignty was completely
subject to the plenary power of Congress. The states’ authority to
regulate on-reservation conduct and to require tribes to take part
in tax collection, recordkeeping, and disclosure was firmly
established.
State regulatory jurisdiction over off-reservation
activities was even greater.
207.
208.
209.

See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 176 (1963).
Id. at 177.
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But one powerful aspect of sovereignty—sovereign immunity
210
from suit—was introduced into the law “almost by accident,” and
became a canon of federal common law.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit for Indian tribes
has a sketchy beginning. Possibly, its first mention was in 1919, in
211
Turner v. United States.
The action was one for damages against
the Creek Nation for its members tearing down Turner’s fence,
212
Turner tried
which was on the Creek Nation’s land.
unsuccessfully to obtain compensation through the tribal court
213
system until the tribe was dissolved in 1906.
In 1908, Congress
passed a law allowing Turner’s suit to be heard in the U.S. Court of
214
Claims.
The court of claims heard Turner’s petition and
215
dismissed it.
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the decision of the court of
claims, found that there was no right at law to recover damages and
that no such right had been established by Congress’s
authorization of jurisdiction over the matter in the court of
216
claims. The Court said that “[l]ike other governments, municipal
as well as state, the Creek Nation was free from liability for injuries
to persons or property due to mob violence or failure to keep the
217
In what might be considered unfortunate dicta, the
peace.”
Court summarized by saying that “[t]he fundamental obstacle to
recover is not the immunity of a sovereign to suit, but the lack of a
substantive right to recover the damages resulting from failure of a
218
government or its officers to keep the peace.”
210. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998).
211. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
212. Id. at 356–57.
213. Id. at 356.
214. Id. at 365–57.
215. Id. at 357.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 357–58.
218. Id. at 358. A review of the court of claims decision in Turner v. United
States, 51 Ct. Cl. 125 (1916) suggests that the court did not even consider
immunity from suit. The court questioned whether personal jurisdiction over the
tribe had been obtained, but without answering that question, went to the merits
of the case. See id. at 141. The court said that the plaintiff styled his case as one in
contract, but that the petition claimed that a mob of Indians destroyed his fence.
Id. at 146, 152. If that was the case, the court said, “the Creek Nation is not to be
held responsible for the mob’s action.” Id. at 152. As an alternative theory, the
court said that the action might be one against individuals who were excessive in
their efforts to remove a public nuisance. Id. at 153–54. In that case also, the
Creek Nation would not be liable. Id. at 154. In the end, the court of claims
found that the plaintiff’s action would lie in tort, not in contract. Id. The special
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The dicta in Turner became the holding in United States v.
219
United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. The United States, acting on
behalf of certain Indian tribes, sued U.S. F&G on a bond issued for
220
the Tribes’ benefit.
U.S. F&G and the principal on the bond
raised a Missouri state court judgment as a defense to the tribes’
221
claims.
The state court action arose on the same facts and
resulted in judgment against the tribes on a cross-claim by the bond
principal in an amount that exceeded the tribes’ claims on the
222
bond. In the federal action, the United States, on behalf of the
tribes, argued that the Missouri judgment was void because the
223
tribes had sovereign immunity from suit in the state courts.
The Supreme Court noted the “public policy” that exempted
the tribes from suit and, citing Turner as authority, held that
“[t]hese Indian Nations are exempt from suit without
224
Congressional authorization.”
The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit carried
forward in the cases with little analysis.
In Oklahoma Tax
225
Commissioner v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe of Oklahoma, the
Potawatomi Tribe sued to enjoin the Oklahoma Tax Commissioner
from collecting taxes on all sales of cigarettes at the tribe-operated
226
The Commissioner counterclaimed for the state’s $2.7
store.
million tax claim and to enjoin the tribe from selling untaxed
227
cigarettes in the future.
As in its previous decisions, the Court upheld the state’s
regulations imposing cigarette taxes on sales by the tribe to nonmembers and requiring tribal collection and reporting of the
228
taxes.
statute allowing the action did not expand the court of claims’ regular jurisdiction,
which was over contract only. Id. at 154–55. For that reason, the court said it had
no jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at 155. Even having found no jurisdiction over
the type of claim, the court ended its opinion by saying, “We conclude that the
Creek Nation is not liable to the plaintiff, and his petition must, therefore, be
dismissed.” Id. Nothing in the court of claims opinion suggested that the issue of
tribal sovereign immunity from suit was ever considered.
219. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
220. Id. at 510.
221. Id. at 511.
222. Id. at 510.
223. Id. at 510–11.
224. Id. at 512.
225. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
226. Id. at 507.
227. Id. at 507–08.
228. Id. at 512.
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With respect to the counterclaim for unpaid taxes, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, recognized the tribe’s sovereign
immunity from suit and, relying on U.S. F&G, held that the
immunity also applied to Oklahoma’s counterclaim for taxes
229
The Court rejected Oklahoma’s arguments that tribal
owed.
sovereign immunity from suit should be limited or abandoned in
the immediate case because it “impermissibly burdens the
administration of state tax laws” or “because tribal business
activities such as cigarette sales are now so detached from
traditional tribal interests that the tribal sovereignty doctrine no
230
longer makes sense in this context.”
The state argued that by barring suit against the tribe to collect
the taxes or compel regulatory compliance, the Court had provided
231
The Court recognized that sovereign
a right without a remedy.
immunity from suit might bar the state from the most efficient
232
remedy, but that it did not preclude all remedies. In considering
other remedies that may be available, the Court pointed out that it
has never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe would
233
not be liable for damages in an action brought by the state. Thus,
some sort of suit against a tribal officer was apparently permitted
under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit.
The most recent attempt to narrow or reverse the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity from suit occurred in 1998 in Kiowa Tribe
234
v. Manufacturing Technologies.
There, defendant sued in state
court to collect a contractual debt of $285,000 owed by the Kiowa
235
Tribe. Although the facts were not entirely clear, it appeared that
the debt was incurred off the reservation and that payments were to
236
be made off the reservation.
The transaction was a commercial
237
The tribe opposed state
one not involving tribal government.
238
court jurisdiction based on its immunity from suit in state courts.
The Supreme Court, in a skeptical opinion, upheld the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit with five Justices

229. Id. at 509–10.
230. Id. at 510.
231. Id. at 514.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
235. Id. at 754.
236. See id. at 753–54.
237. Id. at 753.
238. Id. at 753–54.
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239

joining Justice Kennedy in the majority.
A strongly worded
dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by two other Justices, would have
limited the doctrine to actions involving tribal government and
would not apply it to the commercial litigation under
240
consideration. What makes the case especially interesting is that
even the majority opinion, while maintaining the doctrine,
expresses much doubt in its continuing application.
Justice Kennedy started the opinion with a statement that
tribes are subject to suit only where authorized by Congress or
241
when the tribe has waived its immunity.
He pointed out that in
upholding immunity from suit, the Court has not made a
distinction based on where the conduct occurred or on whether it
242
involved governmental or commercial activities.
The state
regulatory cases, he pointed out, are not contradictory to this
doctrine, as “[t]here is a difference between the right to demand
compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce
243
them.”
Justice Kennedy then examined the origins of tribal immunity
from suit, tracing the roots of the doctrine to its almost accidental
recognition in Turner through the recent effort to have it narrowed
244
He acknowledged that the doctrine “can be
in Potawatomi.
challenged as inapposite to modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises
245
extending well beyond traditional tribal customs and activities”
and that “[t]here are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating
246
the doctrine.”
Nevertheless, the majority declined to confine the doctrine to
reservations or to noncommercial activities, “defer[ring] to the role
247
Congress may wish to exercise in this important judgment”
because “Congress is in a position to weigh and accommodate the
competing policy concerns and reliance issues. The capacity of the

239. Id. at 753–60.
240. Id. at 760–66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 754. (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Bethold Reservation
v. Wold Eng’g P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 58 (1978); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512
(1940)).
242. Id. at 755.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 756–57.
245. Id. at 757–58.
246. Id. at 758.
247. Id.
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Legislative Branch to address the issue by comprehensive
248
legislation counsels some caution by us in this area.”
In the Court’s final paragraph, suggesting a possible limit of
the holding to the facts of the case, Kennedy concludes, “Tribes
enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those contracts
involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they
249
were made on or off a reservation.”
One may assume that, in reaching its conclusion in Kiowa, the
Court was simultaneously considering what was happening in
Congress. Kiowa was argued in January 1998. In February 1998,
Senator Slade Gordon introduced the “American Indian Equal
Justice Act,” identified as “a bill to provide for Indian legal
250
reform.”
Passage of the bill would have resulted in sweeping
changes in the law, giving federal and state courts jurisdiction over
most claims against tribes and waiving sovereign immunity for
251
those actions. Kiowa was decided on May 26, 1998. Hearings on
Senator Slade’s bill were held in March and May 1998, but the bill
252
was never voted on by the Senate.
Justice Stevens, leading the dissent and joined by Justices
Thomas and Ginsburg, believed that rather than merely following
precedent, the majority was extending tribal immunity from suit
253
beyond its previous contours.
No previous case had considered
immunity from suit in a purely commercial activity that did not
involve on-reservation conduct. The dissenters would not expand
the doctrine and would have allowed the state court matter to
254
proceed.
The net result of Kiowa seems to be an invitation to Congress
to act, coupled with a skeptical, although still absolute, holding that
tribes are immune from suit, at least in contract. The limit of the
principal holding to contract cases probably results from Justice
Kennedy’s care not to extend the holding beyond the facts of the
case.

248. Id. at 759.
249. Id. at 760.
250. American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. § 2, reprinted in
144 CONG. REC. S1155–06 (1998) (proposed).
251. Id.
252. See Timothy Egan, Backlash Growing as Indians Make a Stand for Sovereignty,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=940DEFDA1430F93AA35750C0A96E958260.
253. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760.
254. See id. at 760 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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After Kiowa, there remained three points on which a challenge
to tribal immunity from suit might be supported. The first is that
Kiowa was limited to suits on contracts. Second, in Kiowa, the Court
was urged to confine tribal immunity to suits arising on the
reservation or related to noncommercial activity, but Justice
Kennedy said that “[w]e decline to draw this distinction in this
255
case,” possibly suggesting that there may be a case where the
distinction would be drawn. Finally, the door remained open from
the holding of Potawatomi that suit might be authorized against
individual tribal officers.
In fact, three courts, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, the Iowa Supreme Court, and the North Dakota
Supreme Court have all narrowed Kiowa and allowed suits in equity
against Indian tribes with neither congressional nor tribal
256
consent.
Although the cases straying from the Kiowa ruling are few, that
they exist, and that in at least one case the petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied, suggest that the
doctrine of tribal immunity from suit is not yet settled. Congress
has not accepted the Kiowa Court’s invitation to act in the nine
years since its proffer. The three justices who joined in the Kiowa
dissent are still members of the Court; two of the six in the majority
no longer serve. The right case could result in a significant shift in
the federal common law of tribal sovereign immunity. Some
thought that case would be Fair Political Practices Commission v. Agua

255. Id. at 758 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
256. See generally Comstock Oil & Gas v. Ala. & Coushatta Indian Tribes of Tex.,
261 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002) (denying sovereign
immunity from suit for injunctive relief for both tribal officers and the tribes
themselves); TTEA v. Yselta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding
that tribal officers had no sovereign immunity from suit in an action for an
injunction, limiting Kiowa to suits on contract); Wasker v. Bear, No. 04-1917 (Iowa
Ct. App. filed Oct. 25, 2006) (involving a tribal leadership dispute holding that the
tribe was an indispensable party but denying defendants’ argument that once the
tribe was joined, tribal sovereign immunity from suit would preclude state
jurisdiction; holding that tribal sovereign immunity from suit is not available in an
action for declaratory judgment which does not include a claim for damages);
Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land & Turtle Mountain Band
of Chippewa Indians, 643 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 2002) (holding that tribal sovereign
immunity from suit was not applicable in a state action to condemn land held by
the tribe in fee, noting that the action was not one for damages and that the land
was off the reservation).
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which began in California in

AGUA CALIENTE: BIG MONEY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The development of Indian law in the United States over more
than 160 years, summarized in the above sections, set the stage for
the most recent and most direct state challenge to tribal sovereign
immunity: The California Fair Political Practices Commission (the
“FPPC”) sued the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians in
California state court seeking injunctive relief and money
258
The FPPC alleged unreported contributions in excess
damages.
259
of $7,500,000.
The Agua Caliente Band filed a motion in the trial court to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the doctrine of tribal
260
sovereign immunity from suit. The trial court denied the Band’s
261
motion and the matter was appealed to the California Court of
262
Appeal, which also denied the Band’s requested relief.
The
California Supreme Court granted the Band’s petition for review in
the matter of Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Fair Political
263
Practices Commission.
On one side of the dispute was the Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians situated in southern California. Before the
existence of the United States, the Agua Caliente Band inhabited
about 2000 square miles of land around what is now the Palm
264
In the 1860s the United States
Springs area of California.
government gave the odd-numbered sections of land in that area to
265
the Southern Pacific Railroad. In 1876, the Agua Caliente Indian
Reservation was established by executive order of President
266
Grant.
Because of the previous grants to the railroad, the
257. No. 02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Feb. 27,
2003).
258. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians, 148 P.3d 1126, 1128 (Cal. 2006).
259. Id. at 1128–29 (alleging unreported contributions in excess of $7,500,000
in count one). The penalty for unreported contributions is one times the amount
that was not reported. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 91004.
260. Aqua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1129.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1126.
264. Aqua Caliente History & Culture, supra note 1.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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reservation consisted of a checkerboard pattern of sections of land
267
totaling 31,500 acres.
The Agua Caliente Reservation was subject to the allotment
laws of the United States, ending in 1959, at which time Congress
authorized the Tribe and its members to lease their land for
268
Today, much of the original
periods up to ninety-nine years.
reservation has been developed under such leases and underlies
much of Palm Springs, Cathedral City, and portions of Rancho
269
Mirage. The Tribe itself operates two major casinos, a golf resort,
270
It has another
and other commercial operations on its land.
hotel under construction and is involved in condominium and
271
single family home developments.
On the other side of the dispute was the FPPC, which is
charged with administration and enforcement of California’s
272
Political Reform Act (PRA), adopted by initiative in 1974.
As a
citizen initiative, the PRA included findings adopted by the voters.
Among these were findings that large campaign contributions by
lobbyists and organizations allow them to “gain disproportionate
273
and that previous
influence over governmental decisions”
campaign finance laws “suffered from inadequate enforcement by
274
state and local authorities.”
The PRA, like many post-Watergate campaign finance
regulation schemes (including Minnesota’s 1974 Ethics in
275
Government Act),
provided for a comprehensive system of
regulation and disclosure of financial activities that could influence
276
277
278
elections or elected officials. Buckley v. Valeo, and other cases
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Aqua Caliente Tribal Enterprises, http://www.aguacaliente.org/Tribal
Enterprises/tabid/60/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
271. Id.
272. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 81000–91014 (2005). See also § 81000
(noting the PRA’s approval and effective dates).
273. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81001(c).
274. Id. at subdiv. (h).
275. 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 470 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ch. 10A
(2006)).
276. See generally Roger Jon Diamond et al., Political Reform Act: Greater Access to
the Initiative Process, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 453 (1975) (providing a comprehensive
examination of the PRA). See also Daniel A. Weitzman, Expenditure Limitations in
Campaigns for Statewide Office in California, 6 PAC. L.J. 631, 658 (1975) (“Unlike
many states plagued by ineffective legislation in the form of vague, unenforceable,
and loophole ridden campaign financing laws, the Political Reform Act of 1974
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have clarified the constitutionality of such statutory schemes, and in
279
Agua Caliente the tribe did not challenge the PRA itself.
Also, in Agua Caliente, the Tribe “recognized that the state has
the power to regulate political campaigns or create campaign
280
Given the
contribution disclosure rules within its borders.”
history of the regulatory cases, it would be hard to conceive of a
situation more appropriate for state regulation. A key state interest
was at issue, no federal preemption existed, and, because the
Tribe’s reservation was created by executive order rather than
281
treaty, no sovereignty issue could be based on treaty language.
Having conceded the state’s authority to regulate, the Tribe
was left with the sole defense of its sovereign immunity from suit,
and it was on this issue that the matter reached the state supreme
court (the trial court and intermediate appellate court had both
282
ruled against the Tribe).
The FPPC acknowledged that the Tribe had not waived its
claim of sovereign immunity from suit and that Congress had not
283
authorized the suit.
The question, then, was whether the state’s
right to regulate in the area of campaign finance and lobbying and
to enforce those regulations by legal action was sufficient to
overcome the Tribe’s immunity from suit.
The Tribe argued that its immunity from suit arose from the
U.S. Constitution, but it was unable to provide support for that
provides California with the necessary machinery for controlling and enforcing
the new campaign expenditure limitations.”).
277. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act limiting individual contributions to campaigns and requiring
disclosure of expenditures are constitutional, despite First Amendment free
speech objections).
278. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding
that Federal Election Campaign Act provision prohibiting direct expenditure of
corporate funds in connection with election to public office, as applied to antiabortion group’s distribution of letters and pamphlets, violates the First
Amendment right to free speech); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S.
197 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment right to association must yield to
the interests that Congress sought to protect by enacting the Federal Election
Campaign Act).
279. See Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians, 148 P.3d 1126, 1129–30 (Cal. 2006).
280. Id. at 1130.
281. Id. at 1130, 1132.
282. See id. at 1129–30 (discussing the lower courts’ opinions).
283. Real Party in Interest’s Opp’n Br. on the Merits at 9, Agua Caliente Band
of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 148 P.3d 1126 (Cal. 2006) (No. S123832),
2005 WL 760047.
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284

position. In fact, the historical review in the previous sections of
this Article suggests that there is no such support to be found. Any
sovereign right to immunity from suit would have to arise from a
tribe’s inherent sovereignty or from treaties, giving it exclusive
jurisdiction over its land. Having no treaty, the Agua Caliente
Tribe’s sovereign immunity from suit could be based only on
federal common law. Case law supporting that immunity had a
weak beginning and culminated with the less-than-enthusiastic
endorsement of the Kiowa Court.
Considering the Supreme Court’s misgivings about the
doctrine of immunity from suit expressed directly in the Kiowa
dissent, and also acknowledged by that Court’s majority, it is easy to
speculate that had Agua Caliente reached the California Supreme
Court solely on the arguments raised in previous cases, the
California justices may have found Agua Caliente to be the case
where the distinction from other cases was sufficient to allow them
to explicitly draw the contours of the doctrine.
The FPPC, however, in its unique role as protector of the
sovereign state’s elections process, was able to raise constitutional
issues that had not been available to previous states seeking to sue
Indian tribes. To surmount the remaining “slender reed” of
support for immunity from suit left after Kiowa, the FPPC claimed it
had an affirmative right to sue the Tribe under the United States
Constitution. To support its claim, the FPPC relied on the
285
Guarantee Clause and the states’ reserved rights expressed in the
Tenth Amendment to argue that the state had a constitutional
right to enforce its campaign finance laws by suit and that this
constitutional right superseded any common law or inherent right
286
the Tribe had immunizing it from suit by the state.
Article IV, Section 4, provides: “The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
287
The Tenth Amendment provides: “The
Government . . . .”
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
284. See Agua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1131 (“The Tribe asserts that sovereign
immunity from suit has a constitutional basis because the [F]ederal Constitution
provides Congress with plenary power over Indian affairs. The Tribe, however,
fails to cite any authority that specifically states that tribal immunity from suit is a
constitutional imperative.”).
285. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
286. See Agua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1135–36 (setting forth the FPPC’s
contentions with respect to the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment).
287. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

35

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 7
GOLDSMITH - ADC

694

2/3/2008 2:55:06 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
288
or to the people.”
289
The FPPC cited Gregory v. Ashcroft in support of its position
that constitutional provisions guarantee it the right to regulate
290
Gregory
election finance and to sue to enforce its regulations.
dealt with a Missouri constitutional provision setting qualifications
291
for state judges. The provision was alleged to be in conflict with a
federal statute, and the question was whether the federal statute
292
must be given application. The state constitutional provision, the
Court said, went “beyond an area traditionally regulated by the
States” to a decision “of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign
entity” since, “[t]hrough the structure of its government, and the
character of those who exercise government authority, a State
293
defines itself as a sovereign.”
In addition to upholding Missouri’s right to regulate the
qualifications of elected officials by its conclusion that Congress did
not intend the federal statute’s application to extend into this area
of traditional state sovereignty, the Court discussed, in dicta, its
recent line of cases addressing “the unique nature of state decisions
294
Quoting
that ‘go to the heart of representative government.’”

288. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
289. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
290. See Real Party in Interest’s Opp’n Br. on the Merits, supra note 283, at 12.
291. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 455.
292. Gregory was a case in which the state mandatory age limit for judges
conflicted with a federal statute prohibiting age discrimination. Id. The Court
held that the federal statute did not apply to state court judges because Congress,
in order to “upset the usual constitutional balance” between federal power and the
state’s rights retained under the Tenth Amendment to regulate its own elections,
would have had to “make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute.” Id. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted). Having disposed of
the matter through limiting statutory construction, the Court did not reach the
Guarantee Clause issue, rendering its statements in that regard dicta. See id. at
458, 463.
293. Id. at 460.
294. Id. at 461 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
Sugarman was the first in a series of cases to consider the restrictions
imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
on the ability of state and local governments to prohibit aliens from
public employment. In that case, the Court struck down under the
Equal Protection Clause a New York City law that provided a flat ban
against the employment of aliens in a wide variety of city jobs.
Id.
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295

Oregon v. Mitchell, the Court recognized that “the Framers of the
Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as
provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections
296
. . . .”
The Gregory Court said that the states’ authority that lies “at the
heart of representative government” is reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment and guaranteed them by that provision of
the Constitution under which the United States “guarantee[s] to
297
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”
The FPPC went on to argue that laws designed to prevent
corruption of the political process, such as the PRA, are an exercise
of the states’ constitutional power to regulate elections and the
298
constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government.
Those states’ constitutional rights, the FPPC argued, must be given
effect over the Tribe’s immunity from suit, which is a creation of
299
federal common law.
By citing cases in which states challenged federal laws that
300
infringed on the states’ sovereign governments and selecting
quotes of general principle, many of which were dicta, the FPPC
attempted to elevate the Guarantee Clause and the reservation of
rights in the Tenth Amendment to create an affirmative power in
the state to sue not the federal government, but other entities, to
enforce the asserted constitutional right.
The Tribe argued that the Guarantee Clause is not a grant of
authority or an affirmative right to the states; rather, it imposes an
obligation on the federal government to guarantee to the states a
301
republican form of government. The Guarantee Clause may have
been relevant for consideration in the cases cited by the FPPC
because those cases arose on the basis of claims that Congress, by
295. 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (invalidating a federal statute that imposed, inter alia,
a national voting age for state elections; this case was in turn abrogated by the
ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971).
296. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461–62 (quoting Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124–25).
297. Id. at 463 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648).
298. Real Party in Interest’s Opp’n Br. on the Merits, supra note 283, at 14–16.
299. Id.
300. See id. at 12–13. The FPPC relied on Gregory, which did not reach the
Guarantee Clause question since the Court held the federal statute was not
intended to apply. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. The FPPC also relied on Mitchell,
which dealt with federal statutes that attempted to impose voting requirements on
state elections. See 401 U.S. 112 (1970).
301. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians’ Opening Br. on the Merits at
47–55, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 148 P.3d 1126
(Cal. 2006) (No. S123832), 2004 WL 2823274.
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passing laws that were inapposite to the state’s right to a republican
302
form of government, had breached the constitutional guarantee.
The California Supreme Court said:
The Tribe correctly notes that the high court has not
applied the Tenth Amendment or the guarantee clause to
uphold a state’s enforcement of a state election provision
against a sovereign tribe. But neither has the court held
that the federal common law doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity trumps state authority when a state acts in
political matters resting firmly within its constitutional
303
prerogatives.
The California Supreme Court could have stopped at that
point and concluded that the case was sufficiently different from
any considered before and therefore the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity from suit would not apply under the facts of
the case. But the court did not take such an approach. Rather, it
went on to discuss the importance of state elections and the state’s
ability to guard against corruption of the election process, finally
holding that “the guarantee clause, together with the rights
reserved under the Tenth Amendment, provide the FPPC authority
under the Federal Constitution to bring suit against the Tribe in its
304
enforcement of the PRA.”
Thus, the California court elevated the Article IV, Section 4
guarantee of a republican form of government, and the Tenth
Amendment reservation of rights, to a full-blown affirmative
constitutional right held by the State of California to sue Indian
tribes in state court to preserve the integrity of the state’s election
finance regulatory system. The California court moderated its
position only slightly in the conclusion section of its opinion,
saying:
In light of evolving United States Supreme Court
precedent and the constitutionally significant importance
of the state’s ability to provide a transparent election
process with rules that apply equally to all parties who
enter the electoral fray, we find the FPPC states the better
case. Although concepts of tribal immunity have longstanding application under federal law, the state’s exercise
302. Id.
303. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians, 148 P.3d 1126, 1138 (Cal. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 462; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)).
304. Id. at 1138–39.
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of state sovereignty in the form of regulating its electoral
process is protected under the Tenth Amendment and
the guarantee clause. We therefore find that the Tribe
lacks immunity from suit for its alleged failure to follow
305
the PRA’s mandated reporting requirements.
Justice Moreno, joined by two other justices, dissented and
would have held that the state did not have authority to sue the
306
The dissenters would have rejected the constitutional
Tribe.
arguments raised by the FPPC and instead relied on Kiowa and the
long line of Supreme Court precedent holding that Indian tribes
307
have sovereign immunity from suit.
The opinion of the California Supreme Court was filed on
December 21, 2006. A Petition for Rehearing was denied on
308
On May 8, 2007, the Tribe requested an
February 28, 2007.
extension of sixty days within which to file a petition for writ of
309
certiorari. That request was granted and the petition was due not
310
later than July 28, 2007.
On July 12, 2007, the Tribe notified the California Supreme
Court that it had entered into a Stipulation for Judgment and that
311
The Tribe
judgment had been entered in the district court.
indicated that it would not be filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
312
to the Supreme Court.
In its stipulation for judgment, the Tribe waived its sovereign
immunity for any action by the FPPC to enforce California’s

305. Id. at 1140.
306. Id. at 1140–1145 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
307. See id.
We have now begun to enter a new era in which tribal economic and
political power is growing, and the ideal of tribal sovereignty is becoming
more concretely realized. If the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
needs to be modified to respond to these changes, federal law teaches
that it is Congress, not the states, that is constitutionally delegated and
historically assigned the task of making that modification, and it is in a
unique position “to weigh and accommodate the competing policy
concerns and reliance interests.”
Id. at 1145 (quoting Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998)).
308. California Appellate Courts Case Information, http://appellatecases.
courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=316566&doc_no=S123
832 (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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313

Political Reform Act.
It also agreed to pay a civil penalty of
314
$250,000. Judgment was entered accordingly.
VIII.

SUMMING IT ALL UP: STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS DRAW
THE FIRST FIRM LIMITS ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

The law of Indian tribal relationships with states has changed
dramatically from its roots in Worcester, in which Justice Marshall
held with great clarity that “[t]he Cherokee nation, then, is a
distinct community . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no
315
force . . . .” In Kiowa, however, the majority found only a “slender
316
reed” to support the original doctrine of tribal immunity from
suit and recognized “reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating
317
the doctrine.”
Since Kiowa a few courts have distinguished the matters before
them and held that there is no tribal sovereign immunity from a
318
California, after Agua Caliente, became
suit for equitable relief.
the fourth jurisdiction to define the contours of tribal sovereign
immunity from suit and the first to deny such immunity in an
319
It is also the first to rely on a
action for monetary damages.
holding that the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment of
the Constitution give rise to an affirmative right in the state to sue
to defend its republican form of government.
The result reached by the California Supreme Court is not as
surprising as its reasoning. With scant support in the cases, it
found a previously unrecognized affirmative state constitutional
right, which it then held was sufficient to override the federal
common law holding that Indian tribes are generally immune from
suit. While the result may be presumed to be correct, the court’s
position would have been more easily reconciled with the federal
320
321
common law developed from M’Intosh
through Kiowa if the
court had recognized the state’s constitutional interest in protecting
its election processes without elevating that interest to a
313. Stipulation for J., FPPC v. Agua Caliente, No. 02AS04545 (Sacramento
County Super. Ct. of Cal. 2002).
314. Id.
315. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
316. 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998).
317. Id. at 758.
318. See supra note 256.
319. See id.
320. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
321. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
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constitutional right. The court could have taken the position of the
Fifth Circuit, and the other courts in cases cited above, and held
that the matter before it was one in which the distinction not made
322
in Kiowa could, in fact, be made and would be controlling.
No case has been considered by the Supreme Court in which a
state right so fundamental as regulating and protecting election
processes was at odds with an Indian tribe’s assertion of its right to
act free from the responsibility to answer for its actions in court.
Should such a case reach the high Court, it seems quite possible
that the contours of tribal sovereign immunity from suit will finally
be drawn and that the doctrine’s application will be held to end
where a state’s interest in preserving its republican form of
government begins. This can be accomplished, of course, without
elevating the Guarantee Clause or the reservation of rights in the
Tenth Amendment to create an affirmative right to sue an entity
other than the federal government.
The fact that the Agua Caliente Band decided to settle its
dispute with the FPPC with a waiver of sovereign immunity from
suit for all matters arising under the California Political Reform Act
suggests that its evaluation of the law may have resulted in a similar
conclusion. Whether used to create a new right, or simply seen as a
strong recognition of important state interests, the constitutional
provisions argued by the FPPC could have easily tipped the delicate
balance in the Supreme Court.
As the examination of cases in this Article suggests, even the
most slender reed of authority or dicta can become the basis for
sweeping changes in legal doctrine. For that reason, it would be
dangerous for any Indian tribe to allow a case to reach the
Supreme Court on the issue of tribal sovereign immunity from suit
unless an outcome in favor of the tribe is reasonably certain. Given
the current state of the doctrine, that case may never arise again.
Just as only a sovereign can enter into a treaty, only a sovereign
can choose to waive its own immunity. By entering into a
stipulation with the FPPC, the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians may have actually strengthened its sovereignty. Without

322. Id. at 758 (stating that the Court declines “in this case” to make a
distinction between the case before it and others challenging tribal immunity from
suit).
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question, the Tribe limited its financial exposure and preserved
the Kiowa holding, at least for the immediate future.

323. Stipulation for J., FPPC v. Agua Caliente, No. 02AS04545 (Sacramento
County Sup. Ct. of Cal. 2002). As noted previously in this Article, the Tribe’s
exposure was in excess of $7,500,000. The stipulation provided for payment of
$200,000 to the state, not as civil penalty, but as consideration for the stipulation.
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